Democracy cannot flourish where the chief influences in selecting subject matter of instruction are utilitarian ends narrowly conceived for the masses, and, for the higher education of the few, the traditions of a specialized cultivated class.
John Dewey, Democracy and Education (1985 [1916] :200) Frank Donoghue focuses on the fate of ''the professor,'' excluding academics depending primarily on funded research and consultancy. Employing an array of critical works, reports, and studies (some by sociologists such as Steven Brint and Stanley Aronowitz), he analyzes trends in American higher education and speculates about its future. In his view, the polarized educational world of which Dewey warned has arrived with a vengeance and is destined to become more extreme and impervious to egalitarian change. Donoghue holds that broadsides by turn of the twentieth-century industrialists and social critics provided a ''template'' for today's debates over higher education. Andrew Carnegie, Richard Teller Crane, Clarence Birdseye, and other supporters of big business, he argues, saw liberal arts education to be a wasteful distraction from development of business-like expertise; that is, colleges ignored practicality, efficiency, and productivity and managed their professorial workforce in an unbusiness-like way. By contrast, Donoghue explains, critics, such as Upton Sinclair and Thorstein Veblen, attacked college administrators and trustees for serving corporate wealth and anti-intellectualism, and professors for rejecting identification with workers, embracing rarefied meritocractic ideals, and accepting steep inequalities in their ranks and beyond. Donoghue (p. xviii) holds that today's professoriate internalize corporate values of competition, productivity, individual success, and hierarchy more deeply than their predecessors and that their ''frenzied pursuit of prestige'' obliterates classical educational ideals about cultivating the self and citizenship capacities and dulls mindfulness about the fate of their graduate students and poorly located colleagues. Donoghue (p. 22) believes that the professoriate's naiveté about their stratum's employment conditions hastens their vocation's decline and makes them, in Sinclair's words, ''fat rabbits to the plutocracy. '' Donoghue (p. 56) states that in 2003, 65 percent of higher education instructional staff were adjuncts and that the trend to increased part-time and nontenure track instructors continues to accelerate.
1 He asserts that tenured and tenure track professors are oblivious about this trend and its impacts (e.g., that adjuncts are usually low paid, lack benefits, voice, autonomy, and may even lack office space). Employment prospects in his field, English, and in many other humanities areas, have been weakening for nearly 40 years, but graduate programs and professional associations have not reduced enrollments and often have denied the problem's severity (e.g., treating it as a result of temporary downturns, promising growth and waves of retirements and tenure-track openings). 1975 and 1987 and that many students accrue substantial debt, which burden them for decades, while they toil as adjuncts or in other low-wage jobs. Equating contingent academic labor to the job of cleaning up elephant dung at the circus, asserts that adjuncts sustain themselves with ''success narratives'' about loving their work, having pride in position (those employed by prestigious institutions), or deluding themselves about eventually attaining a tenure-track slot. In his view, starting over outside academe is a daunting task for no longer young, high-achieving academics, who believe in meritocracy, see their employment problems as a personal failure, and lack other expertise.
In the humanities, especially English and History, holds, scholars think of themselves as ''authors''; monographs are the chief ''marker of prestige'' and necessary means for tenure and career advancement. However, he explains that typical sales are about 250 books and that many are seldom read, cited, or taught. He states that university presses are de facto gatekeepers, but their publication decisions are often influenced by matters other than scholarly quality. Although status has long been integral to academe, Donoghue argues, starting in the 1980s, publication of the U.S. News and World Report annual America's Best Colleges issue and other yearly rankings of baccalaureate, professional, and graduate programs exacerbated status competition and made status consciousness more pervasive, self-righteous, and influential. Parallel dynamics operate across disciplines.
2 Faculty criticize the U.S. News rankings, but eagerly await them, because they impact resources, policies, and identities. Even protests about bogus ranks often belie belief in their general validity. At ''upper tier'' institutions and even middling ones, Donoghue holds, concern about rank, colored heavily by prestige anxiety and envy, is a major force shaping student choices, alumni and legislative agendas, administrative policy, and research directions. In an interview, Donoghue (2008) declared that prestige is one of the chief ''organizing fictions of American higher education,'' replacing ''Arnoldian mottos'' about the liberal arts promulgating ''the best that has been thought and said.'' What a reversal of the scenario dreamed of by Alvin Gouldner (1979) , when he spoke of ''humanistic intellectuals'' as a kind of vanguard of a potentially progressive ''New Class'' of professionals and last best hope of the left.
Arguing that tenure is ''disappearing,'' Donoghue contends that defending it on the basis of academic freedom begs the question of why tenured professors have not tried to secure the same protection for adjuncts. He also holds that academic freedom defenses do not counter charges that tenure makes faculty unaccountable and protects slackers or stem erosion of the tenured ranks from incremental decisions to employ more adjuncts to contain soaring college costs. Donoghue explains that higher education's fastest growing sectors, forprofit institutions and community colleges, employ mainly part-time, non-tenure-line faculty and increasingly rely on standardized instruction (e.g., via online technology and course management systems). Their extensive top-down technical control, anchored in information technology, turn instructors into dispensable ''delivery people.'' For-profit institutions and community colleges de-emphasize the humanities, which are extraneous to vocational education and hard to ''granularize'' into formulaic information bits. Donoghue (p. 97) quotes University of Phoenix founder and leader of the for-profit education movement, John Sperling, ''We are not trying to develop [students'] value systems or go in for that 'expand their minds' bullshit.'' Rather than prestige, Donoghue says, expedience rules in these business-oriented lower circles. However, he contends that other colleges, pressed by economic exigencies and student demands, adopt for-profit and community college strategies to provide cheaper, more flexible, jobrelated education. Employing larger numbers of adjuncts, increasing on-line courses, adopting aggressive branding and marketing techniques, and cutting the humanities constitute the future of all but elite-sector higher education, Donoghue claims. Donoghue (p. 114) argues that American higher education is already a ''caste system'' and that the inevitable trend is toward increased polarization. He speculates that, within 50 years, corporatization will have triumphed so decisively that two-year institutions and programs oriented strictly to certification for specific skills and jobs will replace bachelor's degrees. Most higher education graduates, he predicts, will have ''a kind of educational passport'' certifying their qualifications from one or more vocational programs. He argues that the 50 to 100 most exclusive, wealthy colleges and universities will remain largely unchanged and be home to the humanities. He contends that poorly endowed, low-ranked colleges and universities will complete the ongoing shift from ''social institutions,'' serving broader cultural ends, to business-oriented institutions, serving narrow corporate interests. Donoghue sees the ''flagship state university'' to be a battleground buffeted by cross-pressures (e.g., needing to be expedient and prestige seeking) that undermine the clarity of its mission and make its future uncertain. He argues, however, that the middle ground between top and bottom, in higher education, will continue to evaporate.
After The Last Professors appeared, financial crisis, recession, tight credit, low home values, and shrunken endowments generated claims that the higher education bubble has burst, made college costs much more daunting for students and their parents, increased uncertainty about future college enrollments,and exacerbated tensions between job-seeking PhDs, adjuncts, poorly located professors, and comfy portions of the professoriate. The Chronicle of Higher Education, Inside Higher Education, and similar periodicals and blogs have been abuzz with heated debate over imminent crises, increased inequities, personnel, pay, and program cuts, and restructuring. Donohue's mentor, Stanley Fish (2009) (2009:10, 14) said that between 1997 and 2007, full-time tenured and tenure-track faculty declined from 33.1 percent to 27.3 percent at higher education institutions and that graduate assistants increased from 37 percent to 41 percent of the instructional staff at public research institutions.
3 Fulltime administrators grew by 42.4 percent in all of academia during this period. 4 A lobby group representing 60 leading American universities advocated reducing research universities numbers and concentrating resources at top institutions (Baskin 2009 ). Other reports and commentaries portrayed, predicted, or advocated wider use of forprofit and community college strategies and scenarios resembling the caste system described by Donoghue (e.g., Chronicle Research Services 2009). They implied that economic crisis will force administrators to institute more sweeping changes much sooner than the 50 years he predicted.
Donoghue argues unhesitatingly that higher education trends of the last 30 years will accelerate and harden the existing caste system into an educational iron cage. In the book's last paragraph, Donoghue (p. 138) hedges about the professoriate's fate, stating that we could ''forestall'' our ''extinction'' if we heed C. Wright Mills' ''first lesson of modern sociology'' and locate ourselves relative to the epoch's major trends, gauge how they impact our stratum's life chances, and presumably act collectively on the basis of the insight attained. In a later interview, however, Donoghue (2008) reasserted: ''The tenure-track professoriate will never be restored.'' Possibly punctuating his point, a pop-up ad about for-pay, Argosy University's online degree programs appeared directly above the head ''The Last Professors'' when I printed out his interview. Mills aside, Donoghue did not discuss the relationship of higher education trends to the neoliberal regime of governance and accumulation, which has exerted substantial constitutive force on other institutional spheres and left its deep imprint on the historical conjuncture (signified by pundits, theorists, and policymakers as the era of ''globalization''). Donoghue might have lost focus had he attempted to theorize this connection. Also, his Millsian imperative urges readers themselves to inquire and reflect critically Review Essays 5 about the big picture. However, Donoghue still should have spoken with less certainty about the future and entertained contradictions, tensions, and conflicts that could result in divergent outcomes. The neoliberal regime, today, is in terminal crisis or, at least, in need of major reconstruction; the rough waters and possible tsunami could hasten the trends that Donoghue and others portray or open the way for now hard-to-imagine alternatives.
Dwelling on the professoriate's vanities and inequalities, Donoghue leaves aside the question of why prestigious institutions would bother to preserve the humanities. He does state, in passing, that elites rely on humanities scholars and writers for contextual knowledge in policy formation, implying perhaps that instrumental affairs require normative direction and, therefore, effective societal management depends on cultural education as well as technical education. Thus, the humanities are a cultural resource as well as a prestige and class marker for leadership and professional strata. Donoghue's advice to heed Mill's sociology lesson requires an ability to make problematic taken-for-granted social arrangements, detect connections between disparate events and conditions, and employ critical rationality about ends as well as means. Arguably, well-taught humanities and social science courses nurture such skills. But Donoghue does not make a case to explain why such capacities ought to be cultivated in wider circles. He might have pondered the question had he engaged Dewey along with other early critics of corporatized education. Dewey argued that cultural education is necessary not only for intelligent exercise of ''popular suffrage'' and other political rights, but also for the wider social and cultural participation characteristic of robust democracy. He held that ''culture is opposed to efficiency'' when the latter is construed too narrowly and is severed from meaningful participation in cooperative activity.
5 A possibly telling facet of our current condition is that the Deweyan ideal of achieving a just distribution of the means of participation, or substantive equal opportunity, seems to be entirely contradictory to the higher education trajectory that Donoghue plots and that many of us believe must be the case.
The Millsian inquiry suggested by Donoghue should go beyond reflection about the professoriate's location and fate. Does higher educational polarization mirror and facilitate wider plutocratic trends? Are there parallel trends in primary and secondary education? Does today's education manifest, legitimate, and reproduce a ''winners take all society?'' In the 1920s and early 1930s, Dewey warned that if American schools, jobs, and entertainment culture continued to produce ''citizenship fodder'' even the elitist, managerial regime that Walter Lippmann considered to be the only prudent, civilized possibility for mass democracy, might not be sustainable. Dewey believed that our democracy's formalization imperils liberal institutions and opens the way for authoritarian and totalitarian currents in times of crisis. In recent decades, many thinkers, across disciplines, have heralded vibrant civil societies to be a sign of democratic vitality and progress. Neomodernization theorists and their critics from left and from right debate this contention. However, can genuinely democratic civil society be sustained in the type of world that Donoghue says is upon us? If educational inequality is profound, can democratic civil society be anything but a convenient illusion? Can democracy survive if recession becomes depression and, especially, if climate change and other environmental/resource crises require fundamental rethinking and reorganizing of growth, consumption, and built environments? If a higher educational caste system is hardening, it does not portend well for the fate of civil society or democracy.
The Last Professors is provocative, worthwhile read, and has relevance beyond the humanities, even as broadly construed. Stimulating critical reflection about the meaning of the pursuance of scholarly careers, Donoghue challenges readers to ponder academe's intense status competition, the frenetic ''productivity'' that it requires and justifies, its impacts and directions, especially as they bear on our roles as teachers, intellectuals, and citizens. Reflecting on these matters broadly and seriously is especially timely at a moment when higher education is at a possible historical crossroad and is widely and intensely debated in the public square. The title of this book, with its ''curious world,'' evokes Alice in Fellowshipland, and the ironies that ethnography might bring forth when brought to bear on our own culture of self-conscious reason. Even those of us who inhabit and are devoted to this world of academic research may yet marvel that its rewards, the patronage bestowed on scholars and scientists, could have become so fully institutionalized, so normal. A research reputation has become the key qualification for arbitrators of excellence, who push what impresses them to the top and pronounce it cream. Michèle Lamont does not follow through on her book's suggestion of ironical distancing, but examines in earnest a system she knows well. Literary evocation here is subordinated to formal analysis of interview transcripts, including qualitative analysis through ''analytic matrices'' and content analysis using software that standardizes codes and checks inter coder reliability. The quantification yields tables comparing how three disciplinary clusters, namely the humanities, history, and social sciences, invoke various standards of excellence, including clarity, originality, and significance, as well as in how they construe the ideal of ''diversity.'' The tables show surprising similarity among fields, such as English literature and economics, whose forms of writing and analysis are sharply discrepant. Had her topic extended beyond the humanities and social sciences to chemistry, geophysics, engineering, medicine, and management, differences in research practice would become still more extreme. Lamont's point, however, is that the standards being evaluated, at least in the fields she has studied, overlap considerably. Her ethnographic analysis, informed by 81 interviews and observation of meetings of a dozen fellowship committees, identifies some differences between social science positivism and the typical reflexivity of humanists. Yet a considerable domain of shared values, as well as a spirit of compromise and negotiation that the more effective panelists bring to their work, allows academics from different fields to understand one another and to make decisions that are acceptable to all.
Not every professor will reach the point of sitting on fellowship panels for agencies like the American Council of Learned Societies or the Social Science Research Council, but it is scarcely possible to serve conscientiously over a career on a university faculty without devoting much of one's time to personnel processes, including promotions and grants. I do not believe that anyone with experience of this world, at least in the United States, would be very surprised by the main conclusions of this book. While Lamont properly dismisses any notion that ''the cream always rises to the top'' (unaided) or that excellence is spontaneously recognized, she rejects also the cynicism that we find for example in the work of Bourdieu, whose characters struggle only for their own interest, in a battle for prestige and position. She is no Pollyanna, and she certainly recognizes self-regarding motives in the panelists she studies, yet she depicts these men and women working together, according respect to one another, making compromises, and trying to exploit the full range of expertise on the panels to reach good enough, if not perfect, decisions. These decisions, she shows, reflect a group dynamic, and if indeed there are social scientists who think that a social process like this can only compromise individual rationality, her depiction should bring them around.
In the guise of an academic book, Lamont supplies also an elementary ''how-to'' 119-120 ). Panelists should, and do, defer to the expertise of their colleagues from other fields, even while remaining vigilant. They should guard themselves against ''homophily,'' an inordinate sympathy for work that is like one's own. Should they be wary also, she asks, of standards that favor the most elite universities? Such institutions, she informs us, give an advantage to their faculties and students by immersing them in what is newest and most exciting. So it may be legitimate to lower standards slightly for the sake of disadvantaged outsiders. It would certainly be unfair, however, for panels to consider ''evanescent'' qualities, in particular ''cultural capital,'' which give an advantage to those from privileged backgrounds, and especially to the professors' own offspring.
That word, evanescent, struck me as precisely wrong. If a recognition of cultural capital implies a disadvantage for rural and working-class children or for certain ethnic minorities, that is precisely because it can be so stubbornly persistent. And yet it is surely misguided to presume that cultural capital is mere decoration, readily separable by the researcher from real merit. Such sophistication can be the difference between jumping on an academic bandwagon, deploying the latest methods or theory as if they provide a sufficient account of everything, and exploiting a range of resources with skill and subtlety. At the same time, insiderdom can occlude as much as it illuminates. The discomfort of not quite belonging, or a degree of insulation from Eminent Professors at their Elite Institutions, can sustain a critical perspective on the prevailing commonplaces, and even nurture uncommon originality.
Expert panelists judging fellowship applications would do well to give a second thought now and again to what does not appear to be on the cutting edge. Faced with many proposals and little time, the danger that always looms is to be captivated by surfaces. Even scholars in fields that value thick description will often use a more superficial indicator to identify it. Lamont's study, which relies heavily on the words of her panelists themselves, does not give ready access to this other form of assessment, thin description. We experience it more readily in evaluations without panels, or those in which numerical scoring sums up the descriptive assessments. At the National Science Foundation, an average of scores defines a strong expectation of success or failure, from which there usually will not be many departures.
On panels like the ones Lamont analyzes, members from outside the discipline of the applicant will often feel squeezed between a lack of confidence in their own assessment and a reluctance simply to capitulate to what the disciplinary specialist tells them. The best panelists seek grounds for an informed judgment that achieves some degree of independence, not by ignoring the opinion of the ostensible expert, but by respectfully questioning it and comparing with their own reactions. The possibility of proceeding this way is (potentially) the advantage of decision by panel discussion over an average of independent expert reviews, and it confirms Lamont's insight that collective deliberation and agreement can heighten rationality rather than compromise it.
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The Passion, and Passions, of Max Weber HARVEY GOLDMAN University of California, San Diego hsgoldman@ucsd.edu
When Marianne Weber, the widow of Max Weber, published her biography of her husband in 1926, six years after his death, it was considered to be so unusually frank about Weber's life and his enormous personal sufferings, that one of Weber's former colleagues sarcastically remarked that the biography gave one insight into the value of the institution of widow-burning. Yet, starting after her death almost 30 years later, more and more information, and then documentation, began to become available to scholars that painted an even more intimate picture of Weber's psychological sufferings and personal experiences, and in particular his apparently ''redemptive'' extramarital love life, details of which, understandably, Marianne chose not to reveal in her book, assuming she herself even knew the details. Although some works began to appear that challenged aspects of the idealized picture of Weber-notably Wolfgang J. Mommsen's Max Weber and German Politics (1959) on Weber's nationalist politics-the works that then began to reveal, or to speculate, about his intimate life in more detail were not written with any goal of discrediting Weber's work or of unmasking some damning personal qualities or actions. This did not prevent such works, which are still very much worth reading-notably, Arthur Mitzman's The Iron Cage (1969) and Martin Green's The von Richthofen Sisters (1974)-from being roundly attacked as gossipy, reductive, and even vaguely scurrilous. The great love of Weber's life, Else Jaffé, née von Richthofen, lived until 1973-she was also, by the way, the great love and also the companion of Alfred Weber, Max's brother. Yet, despite her continued presence, and despite the explosion in research on Weber since the early 1960s, no one was really in a good position to take a stab at another biography to replace Marianne's, and this for a number of reasons. First, Weber was so involved with the many academics and intellectuals of his time that it was extremely difficult to situate him historically without undertaking a virtual intellectual history of his time, or else relying on others' scholarly work on this period, which was underway, but far from complete. Second, due to concerns about Nazi rule or due to the destruction of World War II, many valuable documents from the time, including much correspondence, did not survive. Third, though much new material had been made available in a 1964 collection by Eduard Baumgarten, a Weber relative, it was still difficult to get hold of and get permission to use most of Weber's enormous correspondence, which was dispersed in various archives or in personal collections. When the work on a historical-critical edition of Weber's works was begun 30 years ago, the general editors proceeded also to collect that correspondence, but they have held it close for a variety of reasons, making it extremely difficult for scholars to obtain the access they would need to write a biography. Indeed, the edition of the works is still far from complete, although the first volumes to appear-edited by Radkau had been able to consult in archives. Radkau's book shows that Weber's suffering was even greater than has usually been thought, and we learn about it here at a level of detail that is somewhat of a shock, since so many of Weber's problems came out in symptoms that disrupted his sexual function and were the object, not only of various ''treatments'' but also of an explosion of ''discourse'' in letters and other sources, including, amazingly, many directed by his wife to Weber's mother. This is only one of the things that makes Radkau's book, now in English and reduced by 300 pages, a unique resource for a variety of potential audiences.
Yet, in spite of the subtitle of this translation, ''A Biography,'' Radkau's book is not really a stand-alone biography in the traditional sense in which we would normally use the term. Nor is it a book for beginners, that is, an introductory work for newcomers to Weber's life and work, for it is in continual dialogue with and critical relation to both Marianne's biography and other scholarly literature about Weber's work, and thus really relies on one knowing much of the life, the work, and some of the disputes about both. It would be extremely difficult to follow the various discussions without other knowledge than this book itself provides. Indeed, Radkau refers every few pages to what, in his view, others have overlooked or not understood. Thus, Marianne's biography, as well as works by Mommsen, Roth, and others, still remains indispensable.
The key theoretical element in Radkau's argument is that Weber needs to be understood in terms of his relation to a very complex and multisided ''nature,'' both Weber's own nature and his understanding of nature, which Radkau considers a ''missing link'' between Weber's life and work. This might be called an ''embodied'' approach to the understanding of knowledge production, something explicitly taken up these days in anthropology and in certain branches of cognitive science. Radkau himself invokes the ''ecology of mind,'' from Gregory Bateson, which may not be surprising, given that he is also a historian of the environment. Unfortunately, despite the many uses of the concept of nature, Radkau does not present us with a comprehensive understanding based on a more systematic study of Weber's use of the concept, nor does he examine its uses in historical context, whether in popular works or more scholarly and scientific studies, so that we can see what might be distinctive about Weber in this respect.
Still, though it may not be a traditional biography, Radkau's book is a contribution on many levels. First, he does provide an interpretation of Weber's life, correcting Marianne's account and providing many details that Marianne did not include, especially about Weber's psychological and sexual issues-he himself calls it a ''myth'' that he relies on to structure the shape and development of the life. Indeed, Radkau seems particularly suited for this aspect of his task, given that he is also the author of an important earlier study of precisely the preoccupation with ''nerves'' in German society of the Wilhelmine period and after. Second, Radkau situates Weber in terms of important parts of the intellectual and social life of the epoch, particularly Weber's many friends and associates, and to do this he draws on the most recent scholarship in many fields, as well as personal communications from numerous leading scholars. All of this makes the book an extremely important contribution to German intellectual, and perhaps ''psychological,'' history.
Yet, third, it is as an interpretation of Weber's work in terms of detailed evidence about his psychological and sexual struggles that Radkau, I think, would claim to be making his most important contribution. This, too, is the aspect of the book most likely to interest sociologists and other social scientists. In this respect, the closest analogue to his book is Mitzman's, from many decades earlier, though the level of documentation is of an altogether different order. This book is certainly a major contribution to a sociology of the emotions, and yet the book marshals evidence from and argues on many levels, not only the intimately sexual. Still, for those to whom the many details about Weber's (and others'!) particular sexual torments seem merely salacious or irrelevant, Radkau has very specific responses throughout the book in the form of inferences, speculations, possible links, not only with the ''myth'' of the life, but Review Essays 11 also with specific claims or findings in Weber's works.
Unfortunately, this is not only the strength of the work but also its weakness, for the book is also filled with what have to be called wild and amateurish speculations about links between Weber's illnesses and his specific insights into society or religion. One cannot even begin to list the unfounded and unsupported assertions, so numerous are they. There is here no clear method or theory about the relations between psychology and intellectual production to guide the analysis, except the method of analogy. As a consequence, many of Radkau's claims will not only be disputed, but also may run the risk of being dismissed out of hand. However, despite the many reservations and disagreements I have with the book, I think Radkau's speculations are of secondary importance, compared with the larger contribution of his work. There is nothing like it, and it should open up many new vistas for thought about and analysis of Weber.
Future-making as a Vocation
PETER WEINGART
Bielefeld University weingart@uni-bielefeld.de
Steven Shapin has written a fascinating new book dealing with the world of entrepreneurial ''technoscientists'' and their networked corporate environments. The book, in a sense, follows the path taken in a previous one: A Social History of Truth (Shapin 1994), where he developed the thesis that a particular social status (gentleman) and the unique trust accorded to it rather than evidentiary proof explains the growth of scientific knowledge. Trust is obviously the central category in this claim, and it is linked to familiarity among individuals.
This thesis which challenges common opinion in the philosophy of science and in (institutional) sociology may be irritated by one prominent development: the emergence of organized and planned science, first in the industrial laboratories of the German chemical and electrical industry of the late nineteenth century, then by the industrial laboratories in the United States up to World War II, and finally by the U.S. government's organization of research during and after the war. Thus, Shapin is out to show that there are still ''some centrally important social and intellectual configurations'' (p. xvii)-(i.e., ''the personal dimension,'' p. 3)-from the ''world-we-have-lost'' but which have been obscured by academic accounts. He sets two tasks for his book at the very beginning: to ''establish the claim about personal virtues and to account for its apparent oddness'' (p. 1), that is, with some simplification: historian (of science) against sociologists (of science), a challenging project. Since he intends to take sociology to test, I allow myself to respond along that line primarily.
Early on Shapin reminds his readers of the origins of the scientists' identities in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and the gradual transition from science as a vocation to job, associated with the weakening of the scientists' social disengagement and their increasing importance as producers of economically and politically relevant knowledge. The ''moral equivalence'' of the scientist becomes a discursive motif whose genealogy reaches back into the nineteenth century and persists well until after World War II. (Strangely, Shapin mentions Alexander von Humboldt only once and Wilhelm von Humboldt, the theorist of the ''humanist education ideal'' in opposition to the ''Brotstudium,'' (education for a job), not at all.) But it competes throughout this time 
